Today's us Dollar Price in MyanmarThe us dollar price in Myanmar today
Dollar price achieves all-time high
With the US dollar reaching a all-time high against Myanmaryat, it sold at 1,376 Ts per US dollar, mainly due to the auto imports policies for 2017. "The US dollar exchange rate ended the day at 1,363 thousand euros. He opened at Ks 1.368 this mornings and became Ks 1.376 around 2 pm.
There is a need for the US dollar to buy and sell automobiles. Under the 2017 Autoimportpolitik 2017, persons who purchased vehicles between 2006 and 2009 must take out old vehicle registration documents before they can request a new vehicle license. Under the 2016 Autoimportpolitik 2016, those who purchased vehicles between 2011 and 2014 can request a vehicle permit by 23 December.
"The US dollar is rising at the present time. This dollar price increase is not a good sign," said Dr. Soe Tun, president of the German Automobile Manufacturers and Sellers Federation. US dollar recovered on the global markets and will have an impact on the exchange rate.
In the early part of December 6, the US dollar index fell 99.96 points on the global markets, but rose to 100.55 points the following day. The US dollar exchange rate peaked on 10 November, the highest level in nine years. On November 22, 1,354 thousand, November 29, 1,357 thousand, November 30, 1,362 thousand, December 1,353 thousand, December 2, 1,350 thousand, December 3, 1,354 thousand, December 5, 1,355 thousand, December 6, 1,363 thousand and December 7, 1,376 thousand.
On 24 April, the minimum price per dollar during the ongoing management was 1,153 Ts. Since then, the exchange rate of the dollar has risen by Ts 223 thousand, which corresponds to an appreciation of 19.34 percent.
Devaluation of the value of the Kyat dollar against the euro
Burma has introduced a foreign currencies management system. This is a useful way to find out how China has used such a system to set the parity between its RMB (renminbi) and the dollar ($), the US dollar. For illustration purposes, we first look at the US-EU China trading balances as shown in the following chart.
Chart (1) shows that from 2001 to 2010 the US purchases (imports) more goods and sevices from China than it does sell (exports) to China. This means that the USA has had a deficit in terms of commercial balances with China for 10 years in a series. That will affect the currency quote between $ and rather than perMB.
Two currency exchanges show how this is done. The first is the US currency trading platform for SMB. Secondly, the dollar currency trading in China. The US stock and stock exchanges is shown in Figure (1). To illustrate this, begin with D (r)0 and S(r)0 yield and yield graphs leading to an average currency quote of $0 perMB.
Consider what happens when US imbalances of account deficit come into the picture, as shown in Table (1). The US consumer now buys goods and sevices that go far beyond what the US sells to China. The purchase of more China goods and value-added service imply an increased US request for SMB.
Consequently, the US demander graph for insolvency volume is shifting upwards to D(r)1. Assuming a constant offer line from S( (r)0) to SMB, the US dollar will rise to $1, the US trading gap with China will mean a trading profit with the USA from China's perspective.
Figure (1a) shows the effects of China's net trading income with the USA on the dollar in the Chinese currency mare. Again, we begin with the D ($)0 and S ( )0 in the dollar market) yield and offer graphs, and the $/RMB ($ per RMB) currency quote is Rand.
In such a situation, the inflow of the dollar exceeds the outflow of the dollar to China and the dollar offer graph rises and moves to the right to S(($)1. This, in turn, causes the currency to fall from $ per million to R1. In order to summarize the previous presentations, two companies, the USA and China, are active in this area.
There was a large US imbalance in this commitment. There will be an increase in the US market shortfall for credit default swaps and the $/RMB currency translation will increase in the US. The revaluing currency conversion will increase the price of Chinese exports and eventually lower these to the US.
For China, a US excess will boost the dollar availability in its economies, leading to a devaluation of the RMB/$ currency, making US goods and service less expensive for China's customers and leading to higher US export to China. At the end of the day, as US import from China declines and US export to China increases, the balance of payments between the two nations will diminish over the course of the year and eventually vanish.
However, as we can see in Table (1), the commercial disequilibrium has not decreased or has disappeared. Quite the opposite, the US account deficits with China persisted for ten years, and the level of the deficits grew every year, except in 2009, when there was a US one.
This is because the Chinese central bank did not allow its dollar to move freely against the US dollar, as stated in the above sales. Instead, it avoided an appreciation of its dollar against the dollar and a depreciation of the dollar against the rm. That will be done through the floating operation administered by the Chinese central bank, which includes the purchase of US Treasuries valued at USD billion.
Figure (1) shows that such Chinese acquisitions flood the US with large flows of S()0 to S(r)1. As a result, the $/RMB currency parity of $1 will fall back to the initial price of $0. China's central bank, which buys billion of US government debt, will also cause an upturn in dollar demands in the country's dollar-zone.
In China, as shown in Figure (1a), the dollar yield trend will go from D ($)0 to D ($)1. As a result of this appreciation in dollar consumption, the RMB/$ is returning to its initial level of positive USD. The use of imports of investments such as US government securities is playing a decisive part in the management of the Chinese floating rates.
China kept $2. 24 trillion of this, the biggest amount accounting for 36 per cent of the group. From 2001 to 2010, why did China avoid a manageable floating and an appreciation of the currency against the dollar? The goods on the US marekt are manufactured in China by US-Multis.
Multinational companies passed technologies, know-how, companies, funds, managment and merchandising capabilities to China to produce laptops, digicams, laundry equipment, outsourcing outsourced outsourcing and so on with low-cost labor. This increased China's increased production, jobs, income and standard of living. ÿÿ The interest rates on these loans are low because they are supported by the US administration and the dollar is a relatively solid one.
Now to the administered floating system in Myanmar, many factors have been cited as causes of the current devaluation of the value of the Kyoto dollar in recent month. One of the main causes of this is Myanmar's growing account deficits. It shows that Myanmar's account imbalance has risen significantly in the last three years, from $92 million in the 2012-13 financial year to $2.6 billion in 2013-14 and $4.1 billion in 2014-15.
As the devaluation of the Kyoto dollar has taken place in recent month, table (3) shows the month-on-month deficit in the current accounts from May 2014 to April 2015. Including Myanmar's external deficit with the remainder of the globe shown in Table (2) and (3), Figure (2) shows the US dollar area.
To illustrate, we begin with D ($)0 the dollar yield graph and S ($)0 the offer graph, which gives the K1000 per dollar exch. If Myanmar now import goods and value-added tax from abroad far beyond what it exports, the dollar requirement to buy these goods and value-added tax on the dollar markets in Myanmar will soar.
Let us say the consumption graph rises to D($)1. Let us also imagine that in a free-float system the K1300 to the dollar is used. However, the Myanmar show directors had concerns with such a free float outturn. During the second half of June 2015, an attempt was made to maintain the K1105 per dollar (+/- 0.8pc) as a currency.
In simple terms, the agencies currently in charge of foreign currency and monetarist policies are also those that performed the same functions under the former system. Myanmar was inward-looking under the past regime, not in the good accounts of the great economies, insulated and subject to many years of imposed business penalties.
At the time, due to penalties and other discrimination, currencies such as the dollar were short and three requirements for its use must be met. a) Transaction demand: to satisfy the dollar requirement - to buy and dispose on the global trading floor; c) Spekulative demand: to have the dollar to trade on the currency, commodities, equity and finance exchanges.
Of the three, in the past preference has been given to anticipatory needs - adequate reserve assets for emergency, man-made and catastrophic events and massive economies disrupted by local and worldwide finance crisis on the other side of the world. Fighting such activity has been an entrenched policy that has continued to this day, albeit with little effect, as monetary speculation has been a cause of monetary stability in the state.
Therefore, the primary concern of those responsible for currency managment in today's Myanmar seems to be preventive and contemplative claims. There does not appear to be enough focus on transactional needs to make sure that appropriate currency is available for the proper operation of the export area.
Table (4) also highlights the need to liberalise the government with its FX revenues to help the personal sectors. Chart (2) shows a traded floating with the aim of setting the K1105 per dollar spot price, leading to a gap in the dollar of.
Firstly, it is not a good concept to take steps to ensure that banking and finance institutions follow the benchmark course laid down by the Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM) and issue alerts and prosecution when not. This will be a return to an old approach to solving a new issue and will be seen as a big setback to establishing an Exchange Rates that are relatively robust and market-driven and meet ASEAN and global standard.
Secondly, Myanmar is no longer insulated and doing its own thing without looking at what is going on among its neighbors and the like. Reunification with the outside is far beyond our ambitions and we should seize the opportunity it has offered us in the ongoing reform process, as well as in the question of foreign currency rates.
Thirdly, it is not enough to focus primarily on the commercial account. There are other points in our external business and finance relationship that need to be taken into account when considering the question of currency translation. This includes dollar receipts such as remittances from our migrant workers abroad, net flows of FDI, external assistance and credit, etc.
Such information should be made available in the ongoing, annual finance and cash balances of payment. Fourthly, there are different kinds of foreign currency forums. We were preoccupied by the face value of the currency. A different kind of interest should be the actual currency parity, which is affected by domestic price increases.
Attracting our interest to the issue of disinflation makes it necessary to take macro-economic policies - namely budgetary and financial policies - into consideration in the context of exchangerate rates. Fifthly, maintaining the current level of exchanges rates well below the level of the markets through the adoption of bureaucratic incentives for those with FX investments in local banking institutions to draw their US dollar and resell it on the open markets in order to make substantial sums.
It is unsustainable, and it reaches a point where only one institution will run out of bucks, cannot honour its commitments to its deposits, could initiate a run of banks, not only in relation to the dollar retreat, but also in relation to the flocks' behavior and the retreat sickness that is infecting the Kyoto people and leading to a serious financial sham.
Sixthly, more accurate, up-to-date and readily available external trading and trading figures should be available so that we can analyze and make further currency course advice. Instead, this is a good moment for us to show that it' s self-sufficient, that it has influence, that it is in charge and that it is the leading player in addressing the question of the devaluation of the Kyat dollar that we are faced with today.
This should not be on the sidelines, so that our administered floating system can be transformed into an incorrectly administered floating system that does more damage than good. The Commission should stop paying too much heed to the preventive and conspiratorial calls for the dollar and focus on the need for transactions so that the consumer is able to have a more beneficial part in our globalisation.
Eight, to show that CBM is taking the lead, it should adjust its benchmark dollar rates more closely to reflect current rates by giving it direct exposure to 57% of government exports. Fixing the benchmark interest to K1200 per dollar could be a good way to do this.
Lastly, a few thoughts on how we can further improve our currency management: The Union of Burma Act 1952, which gives the normal function of a Federal Reserve House to the BBC. My suggestion is that the assistance should take the shape of an advice group headed by a non-German specialist from the European Central Bank, who will provide our civil servants with the know-how and technological skills to allow our European Central Bank to act as an equitable player with other European Union institutions in the area and beyond.
Secondly, I believe that our staff in the BCM will be able to draft a proposal that contains well-founded reasons and makes it clear that we will work in close cooperation with such a group of experts not only to solve the foreign currency issue, but to make the BCM a pivotal body for business reform in the state.
Once our neighbor Singapore had a resident international banking specialist who headed the Monetary Authority of Singapore (Central Bank). One of the world's major NCBs, the BofA began operating in 1694. We' re not ripe enough to have a CBM' s governing body, a banker from abroad.
The second best option I propose is therefore that we nominate a Myanmar citizen who is committed and has the necessary technological and managerial capacities to operate CBM. He is supported and advised in this role by a staff headed by an experienced international bank.