The best Myanmar website Korean MovieBest Myanmar Website Korean Film
Are Myanmar serious about imposing sanctions on North Korea?
In Pyongyang (13 April 2012), Kim Jong-un, the Korean Führer, is standing next to leading soldiers during a ceremonial act. Will this be a genuine change in the relationship between Myanmar and Korea or just a matter of policy? At ASEAN' s eleventh Defence Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) and the fourth ADMM Plus meeting in the Philippines early this weekend, the gathered minister denounced the rocket and atomic testing under way in the state.
The Joint Declaration voiced deep concerns about the escalation of tension on the Korean peninsula and called on Pyongyang to fulfil its commitments under all UN Security Council Security Council Security Council resolutions in this regard without delay. It follows the announcement last Friday that ASEAN member Myanmar has formally announced the removal from its sovereign territories of a black listed DPRK officer in accordance with several UN Security Council motions.
Irrespective of whether North Korea fulfils its commitments (which seems most unlikely ), will other members of the global fellowship begin to impose UN sanction against Pyongyang more vigorously? Myanmar is an interesting case in that Pyongyang and Naypyidaw have had remarkable, albeit unequal, relationships over the years, although the issue is usually raised with China in the foreground.
As a matter of fact, Myanmar's activities are several month old. It took the necessary measures against Mr Kim Chol Nam, a DPRK citizen who served as second secretary at the DPRK embassy in Yangon, Myanmar, and was allegedly a member of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID), which was sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council.
The DPRK embassy was asked to return him on April 26, 2017, and he and his Myanmar relatives therefore departed on June 9, 2017. Burma has acted in accordance with UN Security Council Security Council Resolution 2371, 2321 and 2270. This is the first year that Myanmar has presented an implementing document in accordance with Security Council penalties against Pyongyang.
NK News states that KOMID is known as one of the main arms merchants of the DPRK and has long been described as a unit that avoids penalties. In this Kim Chol Nam's part is in line with Pyongyang's use of diplomatic personnel abroad to conduct illegal and punitive work. However, it is important to mention that Myanmar's step was taken in a setting of continued and intensified US pressures on its army, the Tatmadaw, to break off defence relations with North Korea.
His government, for example, named certain people in Myanmar's Directorate of Defense Industries (DDI), a mass state-owned company that allegedly includes more than two tens of weapons plants and clandestine offshore banks and is part of the illicit trafficking of weapons from Pyongyang. Then in 2016, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Treasury Department placed Kim Sok Chol, the then ambassador of the DVRK to Myanmar, on the official Fed.
DDI was again penalised in March this year following the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act. On July 16, Ambassador Joseph Yun, US Secretary of State for North Korea, paid a visit to Myanmar to ensure that Myanmar's Myanmar army is indeed severing all links with Kim Jong-un's government.
As Myanmar's recent action signals approval of US pressures, it represents a fundamental cost-benefit assessment. To sum up, a further normalisation of the relationship with Washington, which has been characterised by the progressive lifting of US penalties since 2012, is more valuable than the maintenance of illegal and ever more restrictive relationships with Pyongyang, all the more so as the latter is threatening to subvert the first.
The Trump Adminstration will not wait to take penalties, and possible penalties, against the Myanmar army for its racial cleanup of the Rohingya Muslims. Such an opportunity could encourage further Myanmar co-operation with Korea. Despite this short-term pressure, Myanmar's more open approach to diplomatic relations with the DPRK is important given the previous relations between the two states.
During the 60s and 1970s they enjoyed strong political and political links. Though the 1983 Yangon bombings caused Myanmar (then Burma) to break off all foreign diplomacy links, the new Burmese Army Yunta sought to re-establish contacts in the mid-1990s. In 1988, the junta's increase in force and rampant domestic domination resulted in a tough system of global punishment, an arms embargo imposed and global segregation.
Pyongyang, an independent global paraia, needed new trading relationships to alleviate the catastrophic breakdown of concessional trading aid by the Cold War's sponsors, China and the Soviet Union. In 2007, a 1990 swap trading arrangement in which Myanmar dealt in raw materials such as raw materials, wood and caoutchouc in return for Korean assets and technology aid resulted in the full restoration of the relationship.
That was in the midst of even closer Israeli and Korean army relations, which were reported to include NATO aid to build an important tunnelling system under the recently established Naypyidaw as well as aid to Myanmar's emerging atomic arsenal. Apparently, Myanmar's collaboration even expanded to instruct the locals, at the instigation of diplomats from the DPRK, to get peddlers to discard DVD's of the film The Question.
Normalisation began in 2011 when Myanmar's leadership began a phase of transformation from an army to civil government, supported by the 2015 election and the rise of Aung San Suu Kyi's Civil National League for Democracy (NLD). Civil servants have an understanding of better relations with the US and other nations, and the commercial advantages that come with them are dependent on further divisive relations with Pyongyang.
But the scepticism about whether the still mighty Myanmar rulers are prepared to break such links persists. Though a Burmese civil servant described military-military links as a "marriage of convenience," the obscure character of these links and decisions in fact keeps the scale of the transformation open.
Naypyidaw's move to openly recognise the application of UN sanction against Pyongyang suggests that change may be under way. "With the 1983 Rangoon bomb attack, Burma knows more than any other South East Asia nation the risk of accepting DPRK embassies and officers on its territory and could at last follow a mounting international consensus that DPRK embraces foreign embassies and officers more ruthless activity than any other.
" Pyongyang, which has already suffered losses in the Middle East and elsewhere, could lose another much needed resource.