Shan state Map in Myanmar

Myanmar Shan State Map

Streets, rivers, cities, lakes, towns in the Shan state of Myanmar; border with China and Thailand. Rape, drugs and oppression in Shan State, Burma. Maps of hotels in the Kalaw area: Map Myanmar-Shan State United Wa State Army-MNDAA-JPEG. The Irrawaddy River is the only way to access Kachin State and northern Shan State.


The Shan state is a state in Myanmar (Burma), which gets its name from the Shan tribe, the most important part of the Shan state's population. The Shan state consists of 54 Townships. Most of the state is predominantly agrarian. The most important towns of Shan State are Lashio, Kyaing Tong and Taunggyi. The Shan state is bordered by China to the North, Laos to the E and Thailand to the S..

Myanmar is also bordered by five Myanmar administration units. The largest part of Shan State is a rolling plain; there are higher peaks in the northern and southerly parts. Thanlwin River canyon crosses the state. Inle Cabin Factory in Shan State is known for its Lotuses.

Well-known Inle Lake is situated in this part and is a touristic area. Pagoda Festival Inle Phaungdawoo is well known and there are races for one-legged oarsmen. The Kakku Pagodas are antique places of Shan State.

Burma's northern Shan state and prospects for freedom

Burma's army and various ethnically armoured organisations are still threatening the National League for Democracy leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi's coalition to bring about a peaceful solution to the war. The letter concentrates on the dynamic of conflicts to give an insight into the resurgence of conflicts in North Shan State over the past two years, outlining the participating military groups, their competitive interests, the impact of the struggles on the civilian population in the region and the impact of the struggles on the countrywide cease-fire.

The increasing amount of military strife between the Burma army and several ethnically armoured organisations in North Shan State threatens the country-wide peacemaking operation. The country has seen the displacement of tens of thousands a civilian population, the violation of international law by all sides and an increasing blockade of relief efforts by Burma's military personnel. Illegal commercial activities - among them large-scale opiate and heroine productions and the transportation of amphetaminestimulants to China and other parts of Burma - have fuelled the war.

China's part as a partner in discussions between the Chinese authorities, the army and gunmen in the Nordic countries has clearly grown in recent months. 2. The inter-agency consensus requires different ways of advocating to the Egyptian authorities, the Tatmadaw, ethnically based arms groups and civic societies. In order to enable a truly comprehensive peacemaking progress, all sides must be urged to broaden their dialogues and engage in unconditional discussions.

Although Burma has evolved from a decade-long civilian struggle and increased democratic power, the long-running and wide-spread international clash between several ethnically based organisations (EAO) and the Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw) has flared up again. In early 2011, a 1994 cease-fire collapsed as relationships deteriorated as the National League for Democracy refused to allow Kachin factions to take part in the polls that ended the period of Israeli army leadership in the state.

EAO's large operations in northern Shan State - which covers almost a fourth of Burma's territory and borders China, Laos and Thailand to the west - comprise the Ta-ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army (ethnic Chinese) and the Kachin Independence Army. After the cease-fire ended in 2011, the Kachin bases along the Burmese-Chinese frontier in Kachin State (north only) soon became nodes for the establishment or remobilisation of a variety of other EAF.

The United League of Arakan or the Arakan Army of Kachin State and the Protestant TNLA/Palaung State Liberation Front were among them. Soon these groups extended their operation to the north Shan state next to the Kachin Alliance, where the fights continued well into 2013. There is a complicated and difficult to categorize dispute in North Shan State.

Fights were escalating in February 2015, when a former armistice group fraction, the Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army, the capitol of its former enclave, the frontier community of Laukkai, assaulted and evicted ten thousand thousands of citizens. In November 2016, the dispute further escalated with co-ordinated Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army, Turkmenistan Liberation Army, Arakan Army and Kachin Independence Army assaults - formalised as North Alliance-Burma (or North Alliance) - on Burma's important Burmese frontier community Muse, resulting in a dozen victims of civil and military personnel, as well as dozens of refugees to China and the restraint of frontier-trading.

Fights lasted several wars, the insurgents conquered and held the frontier city of Mong Ko before they were displaced by ruling ordnance and aerial attacks. Hits and attacks by Northern Alliance troops are said to have led to considerable losses in Tatmadaw, resulting in great all-around attempts and abjuration.

In order to make things even more complicated, the gun battle between the Transatlantic Civil Aviation Authority and a member of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), the Restoration Council of Shan State (also known as Shan State Army-South), is increasing. Mostly suspected to have affected the country and commercial interests, these conflicts have exacerbated the tension between the Shan and Ta-ang populations in the north.

It has devastated the civilian population. Shan, Ta-ang and non-governmental groups have covered wide-spread and systemic violation by Tatmadaw forces and their Pyithu-Sit-alies. But the Tatmadaw often refuses to recognize or examine wide-spread abuse stories in other parts of Shan State, despite UN Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee's call to the area.

In spite of early pledges of a broader reform under Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy administration, the increasing struggles in the northern hemisphere have helped the unsigned EAOs and their constituencies (whose unified strength accounts for more than 80 per cent of all non-governmental arms groups) to become more misunderstood, mistrusted and marginalized.

In the run-up to the second Panglong Conference of the 21st century in May, the regime strongly denounced the Northern Alliance and insisted that participation must be preceeded by the signature of the NCA. The Shan State Shan Council adopted a proposal in December calling the members of the Northern Alliance members of the Shan State terrorism organisations (a similar effort in the country's parliamentary system was rejected).

During July, Lashio troops issued flyers to warn the villagers of an impending Kachin Independence Army and military intervention, which the groups strongly opposed. Last year's testimonies of Tatmadaw commander in Chief General Min Aung Hlaing and State Councillor Aung San Suu Kyi were almost inseparable.

Aung San Suu Kyi's first declaration as leader of the National Centre for Reconciliation and Peace condemned the use of force by the Northern Alliance and fought for the Tatmadaw's part. In March, it gave early warning of the commitment of five members of the Federal Council of the Union of Nationalities (UNFC) to subscribe to the NCA and cautioned other groups - the Northern Alliance - to be "extremely cautious.

At the last moment, however, supported by China, the North groups participated as privileged people. It has intensified its effort to involve the North Alliance in the peacemaking effort and is successful, demonstrating its increasing clout. In the north of Shan State, the severity of the attack and the criticism of governments and army chiefs against indigenous peoples has further undermined confidence in an already fragile peacemaking operation.

Aung San Suu Kyi's lack of confidence in the government's honesty in pursuing the cause of conflict in the north of Shan State is a pivotal factor. The shortcomings and lost chances of the cease-fire processes to date must be analysed in order to keep the current debates informed and find ways for all parties to engage in dialogue internationally to close the widening gap between all sides on this rich and expanding conflict.

More active pressure is needed from global players for periodic discussions between the federal administration and the army with all players in North Shan State and routinely consult with a number of civic players in the region. It is also important for world leaders to recognise that the escalation of the armistice has occurred, even if part of the cease-fire is cemented.

Both of these trials call for different attitudes to the civil administration and Tatmadaw. Refer me "Township Map-Shan State (North)", Myanmar Information Management Unit, février 2015, info/files/documents/Tsp_Map_Map_Shan-North_MIMU 1251v01_23Feb2015_A3_0.pdf. Myanmar militia, John Buchanan (Yangon: Asia Foundation, July 2016). Antony Davis, "Tatmadaw silently starts the biggest conflict since Myanmar's independence", Jane's Defence Weekly, May 20, 2015.

Aung Thu Thu, "TNLA Exposed to Evacuation by Aerial Attacks," Myanmar Times, February 26, 2016, UNOCHA, "Myanmar: IDP Sites in Kachin and North Shan States", June 2017, Jeremiah Mathieson, David Scott Mathieson, " Gentle les messagers des guerres du Myanmar ", Asia Times, 6 juillet 2017, The Ta-ang Women's Organization, "Trained to Torture", juin 2016, php/82-reports/97-trained-to-torture ; Shan human rights Foundation, "Torture, extra legal killing, and use of civilans as human shields by Burma military during new offensive," juin 1, 2016, http://shanhumanrights.

og/index. php/news-updates/247-torturen-extrajudicial-killing-anduse-of-civilians-as-human-shields-by-burma-army-during-new-offensive ; siehe auch "Covering all the Bases", Global New Light of Myanmar, 21. bis 1-2. Juli. The National Reconciliation and Peace Centre, "Announcement on the Situation of Armed Conflicts in Northeast Shan State", No. "The UNFC's Statement on the Second Panglong Conference of the 21 Century," May 23, 2017. "Consultation and Negotiations with the Government of Myanmar on the Amendment of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, United Wa Central Committee," 30 April 2017.

Cf. Yun Sun, "China and Myanmar Peacemaking Process", Special Report No. 201 (Washington, DC: US Institute of peace, March 2017); Bertil Lintner, "China uses carbon and sticks in Myanmar", Asia Times, 28 February 2017. The Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an Inclusive Burmese Security Process", Letter No. 223 (Washington, DC : US Institute of Security The Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an Incorporation The Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an Inclusive Myanmar The Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an Inclusion The Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an Inclusive Inc The Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an Inc The Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an Inclusive Myanmar The Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an Inc The Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an Inclusive May 2012 The Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an In May 2017 The Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an Inclusive Incorporation The Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an Incorporation The Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an Inclusive Incorporation The Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an Incorporation The Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an Inclusive Burmina The Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an incident The Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an Inclusive process.

This report focuses on the dynamic of conflicts and sketches the resurgence of the pattern of armed force in the Burmese cities of Burma's North Shan state between 2015 and 2017 in the Burmese transitiontodemocracy. The Asia Center at the United States Institute of Peace supports it. Mr. Mathieson is an independant analytical economist located in Rangoon, dealing with questions of freedom and conflicts in Burma today.

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