Nld Burma

Burma Nld

This NLD party symbol is taken from the flag of the Myanmar Student Union (Burma). As a State Councillor and Foreign Minister, she is the face of the government in Burma today. Freie Burma Koalition / Ligue nationale pour la démocratie (NLD). When Aung San Suu Kyi began fighting for the NLD, she and many others were arrested by the regime. Special report on the analysis of the direction of economic policy in a Myanmar governed by the NLD:

The NLD victory has not mean much to Myanmar's ethnic conflict.

With the remainder of the military's retention of control, paired with profound mistrust in ethnical areas, the NLD has few other avenues. A group of high schools and college graduates performed a satire on 9 January, during a locally based peacemaking dialog in the Irrawaddy Department in the south of Myanmar, on the subject of violent conflict between the Tatmadaw (national armies ) and ethnical groups of the protest.

In the next slander lawsuits were filed against the student and the Tatmadaw claimed that the tragedy had "damaged the image of the army". "The incident and the ensuing complaint in Irrawaddy on 23 January have been triggered in recent months by increased ethnical tension throughout Myanmar and a new readiness of both the armed forces and the civil authorities to take action against freedom of expression, particularly on the thorny Rohingya question.

The historical elections of 2015, in which Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) came to office, were a strong example of democracy and peace in the country. Now, the core pledges of this pledge - a settling of scores with the past and a return of confidence between the Myanmar administration and its peoples - are threatened by new repressive policies and Suu Kyi's reluctance to comment on the humanitarian questions she stood up for.

Aung San Suu Kyi took the role of state advisor in the early part of 2016, a reinvented post that still holds her historic and singular status as heir to her father's cultural heritage. It is a good beginning for the Union's first peace conference, also known as the 21 Century Panglong Conference, which takes place every two years.

But it has so far proved to be little more than a topic of discussion and is excluding a large number of ethnically based groups that have not signed a ceasefire deal since October 2015. It has helped a lot to make it easier for groups that are open to changes to engage in ongoing dialogues, but, like all conciliation activities, it is primarily a matter of mutual confidence between the political groups.

Insufficient confidence was the spine on which the story of Myanmar's contemporary past was built. In 1947, the Panglong Agreement between General Aung San and members of the Burmese communities around Burma's former outskirts was intended to give some independence to those areas that were traditionally separated from the governmental structure of Burma's lowlands.

One of the causes why the state has experienced seven decade-long periods of conflict is the government's unwillingness to comply with this treaty and the confidence it has generated to this date. On April 2012 I told of Kachin State in the aftermath of the historical by-election, which was considered the first free and equitable democratic practice in Myanmar in 50 years.

Whilst the predominantly diverse peoples of Yangon and Mandalay were overwhelmed by the NLD's reform and promises, the citizens on the country's outskirts took an extremely acidic stance. "Then the KIA and Tatmadaw recently re-opened a front that had been silent for over a decennium.

Myitkyina was clear that these issues would not be settled in the polls but in the hilly area where the KIA lured Tatmadaw troops into ambush, hiding from air bombardments and eking their lives out of the country. The Tatmadaw and the NLD are both forfeiting the confidence won through the change of government in 2015, and the State Council Bureau has done little to help the state.

The Tatmadaw has been in day-to-day confrontations with the North Alliance, an association of four communities of the North Myanmar ethnical oppositions, the KIA included, since November 20. The Tatmadaw and opposing groups are both blaming the others for the beginning and continuation of the war. This skirmish is probably just a sign of violence - an attitude for the bargaining power before the Union's next peace conference, due in February.

Instead of dealing with these new peace-building bodies, both the Tatmadaw and their militarised opponents are continuing to use the use of power as a first instance, further undermining the trust of the general population in the government's capacity to end the conflict in Myanmar peacefully. Aung San Suu Kyi's pledge is threatened by this continuing and impartial use of power by the Tatmadaw and opposing groups along Myanmar's peri-region.

The State Counsellor's external bureau does not appear to be able to rule the state if the concept of governance is a powerhouse. This situation is mirrored in the interinstitutional obstacles that prevent Suu Kyi's bureau from controlling anything other than the communications strategies of her own one.

Mighty Ministries of Interior, Border and Defence are all still outside civil supervision and the important National Defence and Security Council, under the nominal supervision of Suu Kyi and her civil counterparts, is still under the de facto supervision of Tatmadaw and her nominated members. If Aung San Suu Kyi cannot exert full scrutiny over a country that is still systematic in punishing disagreement, refusing to recognise the human catastrophe in Rakhine state and punishing schoolchildren for a theatre piece, who can have confidence in her and in the institutions for this?

Suu Kyi in her 1991 Letters from Burma wrote: "Considering the Burmese resistance as a danger means misunderstanding the fundamental principles of the democratic process. Suppressing the oppositions means attacking the foundations of the democratic system. "Now that she is in office, her administration has taken recourse to the intimidation of some of the peoples she allegedly represented before.

This undermines the confidence of democratic groups and only increases the probability of sustained military action. Aung San Suu Kyi's promises and powers come from her unparalleled capacity to engage as a communityite. It should not shrink from using this precious stance to drive forward further institution building and to try to remove some of the key controls from the Tatmadaw.

Whilst the foreign criticisms of Suu Kyi often fail to recognise the very realistic barriers to her new position, they often rightly demand that she use her vote to raise the issue of her relapse into violent behaviour throughout Myanmar. It must build confidence in more than just the NLD believers who helped them in 2015.

Mehr zum Thema