Peace, reconciliation and development by strengthening the community. United Nations expert calls for accountability for violence in Rakhine state.
Government of the State and the Myanmar Region
State and regional government (Burmese: ???????????????????????????????????????????) are the subcabinet of the individual states and territories of Myanmar... Head of the State or Regional Office is the Prime Minister. A member of the private office is a minister of the state or local government. It is composed of prime ministers, ministers and prosecutors.
Do not violate the terms of the Constitution, which stretches regional or state government enforcement through the area or state legislation. In addition, under Swiss government legislation, the regional or state government allows itself into affairs. Regional or State Administration Department positions as head undersecretary of the company, the respective regional or state government.
Furthermore, the region or the State Department of General Administration is also the regional or state mission bureau. Prime Minister are the leaders.
Myanmar Buddhism and State Power
Fatal assaults on the border police (BGP) base in Myanmar's north Rakhine state on 9 October 2016 and the following few consecutive trading hours and a severe military upsurge on 12 November, when a high-ranking military official was murdered, marked the beginning of a new uprising there. Present levels of violent conflict are different in quality from anything in recent years, seriously threatening the outlook for state stabilization and growth and having a serious impact on Myanmar as a whole.
There is a major need for the administration to coordinate and integrate its policies, policies and safeguards to make sure that violent situations do not spiral out of hand and inter-municipal tension is kept under check. They also require due consideration of the complaints and anxieties of Rakhine Buddhists. Whilst the regime has a clear obligation to keep safety and take measures against the aggressors, if its reaction is to be efficient it must use more power and concentrate on a politically and politically driven agenda that reflects the feelings of desperation and desperation that underlie the wrath of many Muslims in the state of Rakhine.
This rebellious group, which calls itself Harakah al-Yaqin (Faith Movement, HaY), is headed by a Rohingya Émigrés comittee in Saudi Arabia and is run by Rohingya on the spot with extensive expertise and expertise in contemporary warfare. She is benefiting from the legality of community and non-governmental legal opinion in supporting her cause and has great affection and encouragement from Muslims in the north of Rakhine state, among them several hundred militia members educated in the area.
This well-organized, apparently well-funded group is a turning point in the Myanmar government's effort to tackle the country's many years of discriminatory treatment of the Islamic people, refusal of access to justice and deprivation of nationality. It is unlikely that the present use of excessive levels of armed power in reaction to the attack, which failed to make a proper distinction between fighters and civilised people, the refusal of human aid to an extreme endangered populace and the absence of an overall policy that would give them some sort of hopes for the distant past, would throw the group off course and entail the risk of a vicious circle of violent and possible massive expulsion.
Without the takeover of some regional managers and municipalities, it would not have been possible for Mr Haar to become established and prepare in detail. Yet this has never been a radicalized people, and the vast majority of the fellowship, its leaders and elderly have previously renounced force as counter-productive. An unwieldy safety reaction which does not observe the basic principle of reasonableness and differentiation is not only contrary to world standards, but is also profoundly counter-productive.
Importantly, the government's action is based on an assessment of why there has been a hostile attitude by some Muslims in the state of Rakhine. People have increasingly undermined their human and legal prerogatives, have gradually been ousted from society and politics and have abused them. Since the antimuslim clampdown in Rakhine in 2012, this has become particularly urgent.
A growing feeling of desperation has led more respondents to think about a violence reaction, but it is not too early for the administration to overturn it. An unwieldy safety reaction which does not observe the basic principle of reasonableness and differentiation is not only contrary to world standards, but is also profoundly counter-productive.
According to recent global evidence, an offensive reaction by the army, especially if it is not part of a wider political context, is not effective against the group and has the capacity to exacerbate the conflict significantly. However, there is a danger that if the regime goes wrong, inter alia through the continuing use of excessive violence that has forced ten thousand people out of their houses or across the Bangladesh borders, it could provide preconditions for further radicalisation of parts of the Rohingya people who could use trans-national junihadists to follow their own plans in the state.
In order to prevent this, the reaction to terrorism must be subordinated and integrated into a well-developed, comprehensive policy approach - the development of strong, more beneficial relationships between Islamic societies and the state of Myanmar and greater co-operation and exchange of information with local states. The purpose of this study is to examine the development of a new type of organized violence in the Islamic majorities in the north of Myanmar.
It' important to know and recognize the prospects of the Rakhine Buddhists and their strongly felt complaints. However, the quality of the present violent events differs from everything in recent years and has a profound impact on the restless state and possibly on Myanmar's over all. It examines the creation of a new armoured group, its goals and connections, the reaction of the Rakhine authorities and police and the impact on the population of the State of Rakhine and the State.
The project is built on comprehensive research and interviewing in Yangon; interviewing several members of the Rakhine state' s North Rakhine gun group and village residents and local community keys; interviewing other resources associated with the group outside Myanmar; interviewing members of the Rohingya Diapora, Middle East included; interviewing newcomers in Bangladesh who have escaped from Rakhine; and analyzing discussions of messages such as WhatsApp in the last six month.
Many of the research has been conducted by skilled staff who are proficient in the native dialects that Muslims speak in the north of Rakhine State. Rohingya " is a controversial word in Myanmar because it is considered by most Rakhine Buddhists, indeed most Myanmarese, to be Bangladeshi and therefore they would rather call it "Bengali".
"Rohingya " is not used in this account to support a particular historic story or policy assertion, but because it is the concept that the fellowship relates to itself by an overwhelming majority, and because other concepts such as "Muslims from Rakhine State" are less precise: several Islamic communions in the state do not identity themselves as "Rohingya", inclusive (but not only) of Kaman, a recognized tribal Mandor.
The Muslims in the north of Rakhine state are the ones who most strongly identified themselves as "Rohingya"; those in the diaspora who thus identified themselves come predominantly from this area and not from the centre or south of the state. Rakhine was the frontline between the invading Japan and the Allies during World War II.
The Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists faced each other; most of them stayed pro-British, while the latter backed the Japanese until a last-minute change allowed Rakhine to be re-occupied. Each community was made up of armoured troops and attacking the others, with reports of a massacre on both sides in 1942-1943. Moslems escaped to the northern part, where they were the dominant group, and Rakhine Buddhists southbound.
At first the insurgents examined the option of connecting the Rakhine state to eastern Pakistan (now Bangladesh), but Pakistan refused. Then they searched for the right of the populace to reside as full Muslims in an autonomic area in the state' s northeast, and an end to what they saw as discriminatory by the Rhakhin Buddhist officers who were replacing the settlers.
Migrants have restricted Muslims' freedom of travel from Northakhine to the state of Sittwe. About 13,000 Muslims who escaped during the conflict and lived in Indian and Eastern Pakistani migration centres were not allowed to returne. As well as against the interests of Rakhine Buddhism, the insurgents turned against the regime by quickly taking over large parts of the Nordic region and driving out many people.
Justice and order almost collapsed, with two Red and White Flags in the Mujaidin and Rakhine nationalistic groups, among them the (Marxist) Arakan People's Liberation Party, in the southern part of the state. A contested Myanmar military, faced with ethnical uprisings throughout the entire nation, had little control over Rakhine except Sittwe.
The violent and chaotic situation continued to worsen the relationship between Buddhist and Moslem societies. Numerous moderates Rakhine Islamic rulers opposed the Mujaidin uprising and even called on the regime in vain to defend itself with weapons. In 1961, partially in reaction to Muhammad demand, partially for election tactical purposes, the administration set up a Mayu border administration in North Rakhine, run by military and not Rakhine bureaucrats.
The Rohingya Patriotic Front was founded in 1974, a group of armies based on remains of past defeats, and it was influenced by the rising of pan-Islamicism. They were divided into several groups, one of which became the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) in 1982. In 1986, the RSO was divided and the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF) was divided; in 1998, the two groups form a separate coalition, the Arakan Rohingya National Organization.
The RSO had small base locations in isolated parts of Bangladesh near the Myanmar frontier in the 1980' and 1990', but it was not believed there was one in Myanmar. Bombing raids in the city of Maungdaw on 28 April resulted in damages and several civil deaths.
There was no great deal of grassroots backing for the group, and the police, alarmed by informers, quickly overcame them. Until the late 90s, RSO was largely seen by RSO personnel as an armoured group, although it maintained an organizational set-up in Bangladesh and carried out trainings and sporadic minor assaults on Myanmar's military personnel until the early 2000s.
An Myanmar Army Secret Service statement quoted in a US embassy in 2002 in a US embassy wire made the "generally plausible" assertion that 90 RSO/ARIF members had taken a guerilla warfare course, and thirteen also took part in explosive and firearms training in Libya and Afghanistan in August 2001. Recently, RSO has been held responsible by the agencies for sporadic assaults on Rakhine State's north Rakhine State police, for example fatal assaults on border police (BGP) patrol in north Maungdaw in February and May 2014, one of them on 17 May, killing four of them.
RSO has also become something of a Rohingya militancy that anyone can use, regardless of the links to the initial organization. Inter-communal relationships were severely affected by the anti-Muslim force in the state of Rakhine in June and October 2012, which did not primarily concern the northern part of the state. While it created a feeling of uncertainty in Buddhist and Moslem societies, it had the greatest influence on the latter.
The following year there were several cases of severe anti-Muslim violent attacks throughout Myanmar, as well as activist advocacy for a set of "protection of racial and religious rights" generally seen as directed against Muslims. They were in additon to the long-standing limitations on nationality for most Muslims in the state of Rakhine.
As a result, these societies, in particular the Rohingya, have been seriously discriminated against. Before the 2015 election, the people of Rakhine State were deprived of their civil liberties without a nationality card - almost all but a few Cambodians - and their last link to the political sphere and political and non-violent left. The feeling among many Rohingya that the policy had fail was reinforced by the fact that Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) did not take a firm position on Rohingya's general position on minorities' religion or on the Rohingya's particular needs in the campaignfor.
When she came to office, she made it a top political preference for the Rakhine State leadership by chaired a Rakhine State panel and appointed former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to lead a consultative group. The Andaman Sea experienced an escalating migratory sea crises in May 2015 after a Thai raid disturbed the sluice nets and traffickers and crews left vessels with immigrants from Myanmar (mainly Rohingya) and Bangladesh; several hundred were afraid of dying.
For Rohingya, when these itineraries were not open again until the beginning of the sail seasons after the September tsunami, this signified the closure of a discerning getaway control and desperation among young men who saw immigration as their only hope for a better one. During the early morning of 9 October, several hundred indigenous Muslims, mostly equipped with knifes and slings and about 30 guns, attacked three BGP stations simultaneously in the Maungdaw township and Rathedaung near the northwestern Bangladesh frontier.
The two November 3 assaults that the state press said they were connected to the assailants are more insecure. They signalled a great increase in Rakhine's use of force and mirrored an unparalleled degree of planing in a dispute that had seen little organized hostilities by the people. In both congregations they created a great deal of anxiety, especially among the Buddhist Rakhine village dwellers, who are the majority in the north of the state; about 3,000 of them escaped to the cities.
It was probably intense, reflecting both the needs of the military and the fact that the first assaults and the ensuing fatal confrontations were seen as a serious violation of the safety forces' worth. BGP commandant General Maung Maung Khaing, who is a BGP general, was deposed for "poor performance", probably due to both secret service errors (see section IV.C) and the loss of his HQ and armory during the raids; his successor is a brigade general who was reassigned by the MP.
Myanmar has repeatedly spoken of "joint operations", which usually indicates that the Myanmar Army supports BGP missions. It was used primarily after a "Special Session on NSDS " on 14 October, attended by the Speaker, Aung San Suu Kyi, the Commander-in-Chief and others.
In such a state of affairs, the usual constitutionally established mechanisms for the activation of participation would be the presidential declare of a state of exception with the consent of the National Defence and Defence Council, as has been done three occasions under Thein Sein's government. Although common BGP armies are patrolling, in reality the West Commanded forces have the authorities over safety measures.
In a part of the Maungdaw Townships north, the army has indicated that it is carrying out "evacuation operations", which it has cordoned off. Based on accounts from agencies and non-state actors, it seems to use something similar to its default counter-insurgency response strategies devised in the 1960' to remove the rebels from their four major resources (food, funding, intelligentsia, recruits) and leave them largely intact.
For a long time, ethnic groups and Buddhists in the northern villages have been calling on the regime to arms the village people..... because they are overwhelmed by Muslims and are afraid for their safety. Following the October 9 terrorist attack, there have been numerous accounts of suspected people who have been visually assassinated, the cremation of many homes, the plundering of properties and the confiscation or demolition of supplies of foodstuffs - as well as rape of females and mothers.
In the isolated area, some 30,000 refugees and 130,000 previously received life-saving assistance, with the exclusion of a one-off supply of nutrition to four communities (6,500 people) by the World Meal Programme (WFP) on 6 November and the following day; and a supply of nutrition by the Chinese authorities on 18 November to an internally-displaced population centre that had spurred spontaneous formation in the hamlet of Thu U Lar, were refused shelter.
A further joint feature of counterinsurgency in other parts of Myanmar is the creation of the military in the area. For a long time, ethnic groups and Buddhists in the northern villages have been calling on the regime to arms the village people, especially since the 2012 war, as they are overwhelmed by Muslims and are afraid of their safety.
That is particularly serious in the present situation, since the armament of Tibetan Buddhists in the village could make the Islamic armored group, which has prevented attacks by Tibetan Buddhists, see them as fighting against them. It is worrying that the safety services are considering the take. Recruiting about 120 non-Muslims, originally introduced to the Rakhine communities and probably perceived by the Muslims as BGP-police.
However, there is a danger that the boundaries between civilians and peacekeepers will become blurred, if only in cognition. The Arakan Liberation Army, an armoured group of Rakhine, has tried to strengthen its military force in the region to face an alleged Islamic terror. A number of counter-narratives collide with satelite information, for example that Muslims in the area burn down their own houses to gain cosmopolitan support, or that it is the incendiary of the group.
A number of towns have been devastated over the course of the day, rather than the isolation of scattered geographic incidents anticipated by individual people or small groups of fugitives. In addition, there were numerous forces present during all of the above mentioned missions, not only at the moment of the attack, but also in the following years. Forces also have a sense of safety motive (denying entry to communities in unsafe areas is a common counterinsurgency policy often accomplished in the past by cremating communities in other parts of Myanmar), while the group relies on at least some of the country's civil assistance.
It is said that the Myanmar Times was intervened by the regime when one of its senior international reporters told of rape by warlords. Soon after, she was sacked and the newspaper proprietor imposed a ban on coverage of the Rakhine state war. One interviewee of a well-known regional English-language newspaper, for example, spoke to a member of the BGP who confessed to having burned down Islamic houses in the operating area but censured the report itself.
More potentially, the repetitive sweeping refusals to govern spread through the state press in English and Burmese intensify a sense of impunity for forces that is particularly perilous in a setting of wide-spread feelings against the Islamic people at all arms of the army and in wider civilisation.
State-run newspapers have issued worrying statements, such as one relating to the Rakhine state created by "despicable man fleas", "which we abhor because of their stench". Another serious escalation on 12 November showed that the attack on the police was not unique and that the group was still ready for action despite a period of intense warfare.
Hundreds of village people, equipped with everything they had at their fingertips (knives and agricultural equipment), apparently spurred the onslaught. It is said that the choppers shot randomly, even at village people who flee over rice paddies; video of village people show several corpses in squares, among them wives and orphans. On the same date there were at least two assaults on regional IEDs.
On 13 November, Gwa Son and the neighbouring towns arrived and fired on escaped village people. Video of village people showing several burnt corpses found the next morning in the ruins of a home in ambiguous conditions. These areas are thinly settled, the municipalities often have many years of dispute resolution expertise, well-developed management strategies and generally better nutritional stability.
Maungdaw is heavily settled, municipalities have little previous experiences of fighting, and there is already famine and nutritional uncertainty well above the threshold values. People were already marginalised; the anxiety of conflicts and abuse, coupled with a serious livelihood crisis - almost all of which has stalled human aid and disturbed Bangladesh's import of human medicine - has caused many to cross the frontier.
Featuring an armoured group of militants willing to capitalize, the present reaction to nuclear safety is likely to trigger a perilous cycle of attack, hostilities and increasing radicalization of the population. It would also seriously compromise the safety and livelihood of the Buddhist community of Rakhine and Burma in the north of Rakhine State, where they have long felt like a contested and anxious group.
It is called by the Arab authorities Aqa Mul Mujahidin, a general Arab term that means "communities of fighters", which it has gained from interrogating suspected criminals. Before the raids even the members and community members were unaware of the true name and called it this umbrella term (and perhaps also "RSO", which is why the administration maintained the participation of this old group).
Following the October 9 terrorist attack, the Rohingya churches in Saudi Arabia, other Near East nations and Malaysia began to ask who made it. HaY says that the RSO's members mistakenly began to take on responsibilities and, on this foundation, to raise funds from Rohingya diasporas and large privately owned benefactors in Saudi Arabia and the Mideast.
On October 11, the first tape distributed to the Rohingya network and leaking the next morning on YouTube was called Harakah al-Yaqin in Arabic inscribed. The second, posted on YouTube on October 14, the group used this name to warn donators not to rely on other groups who claim to be behind the attack and said that "some were trying to peddle our cause and our community", a hint to the RSO.
They are all Rohingya emigrés or have Rohingya heir. Several or all have been to Bangladesh and Rakhine State in the last two years at different time. In the Rakhine state of the north, the major combat troop consists of Muslims who have received initial education and are organized in peer groups to reduce the risk of trade off.
As a Muslim from the north of Rakhine state, his dad went to Karachi, where Ata Ullah was borne. That is in line with the fact that he is proficient in both the Bengali vernacular as well as the peninsular Arabic language in the film. In 2012, he left Saudi Arabia just after the outbreak of violent events in the state of Rakhine.
About twenty Rohingya from Saudi Arabia (separate from the Steering Committee), among them Ata Ullah, lead the missions. Several Rohingya came back from the Bangladesh camp (official and informal) before 9 October to join the group. Several hundred young Rohingya men from Bangladesh have been joining the battle since 9 October.
Yet the major combat troop consists of Muslims in Rakhine's north, who have received initial education and are organized in peer groups to reduce the risk of compromises. Although it seems to have no religion, HaY searched for religion's justification for his aggression. On his suggestion, older Rohingya clergy and several international clergy have decided that the Rakhine state's prosecution of Islamic groups makes the Islamic election against the Islamic world' s safety guards legitimate, and anyone who rejects it is contrary to Islam.
It appears that fatwas (religious sentences) were obtained soon after October 9 in several counties with a major Rohingya diaspora, among them Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. They have had a major influence on many Moslem worshipers in the north of Rakhine state to support the cause of Haj, although they used to find force against them.
It also has an older Muslim scientist in Maungdaw, a Rohingya from Saudi Arabia, Mufti Ziabur Rahman, who is bringing spiritual legality to the operation and has the power to release something called FATAS. She has only assaulted members of the military force (and perceptible threat in her own community), not those of religion, Buddhists in the villages or citizens and members of the BGP base she met on 9 October.
In contrast to all other rebellious groups (see above) and for ambiguous reason "Rohingya" is not included in the name. Their declared goal is not to enforce the Sharia (Islamic law), but to end the prosecution of Rohingya and to ensure their right and greater independence as Myanmar nationals, even if their attitude could stiffen the attitude in the state and seriously reject these aims.
The approach of RSO and a large number of ethnically based militarized groups in Myanmar is similar to HaY's, but faces far greater obstacles than the opposition to Rohingya identities by the administration and most of the state. Since the RSO has become a kind of trademark associated with the Rohingya military both by Muslims and the public agencies, it is not astonishing that the RSO administration has recognized the aggressors as associated with it.
However, there seem to be no interinstitutional links, although there are some attempts to enlist some 200 Rohingya in Bangladesh who have been educated by a former RSO army commandant since 2012, but have never been appointed because there is no organizational set-up that Haz may now be able to provide. These have become widely used throughout Myanmar in recent years as wireless speech and wireless communications were introduced along with $20 smart phones (people near the borders had much longer exposure to these possibilities by linking to Bangladesh's networks).
Burma is one of the few markets where Viber is the dominating message application. In October 2016, the organization had 25 million one-time visitors from 51. It has a total of 5 million inhabitants. These instruments have significantly reduced the communications and organizational obstacles for municipalities in North Rakhine State, which the dramatic limitations on movements that have existed for many years can no longer avert.
WhatsApp is the favorite Rohingya message application. That' probably because Rohingya uses these applications to stay in contact with the foreign families and the general community. Following the October 9th terrorist attack, these were used to quickly spread information about safety risks and other pressing problems.
As the Rohingya language of Bengali has no script, a large part of communications via these programs uses sound data or voicemails. Actively recruiting community leadership began in 2013, then educating several hundred village people, mainly from Maungdaw since 2014, first in Bangladesh and then more intensely in the north of Rakhine State.
This was given by Rohingya vets and Pakistanis or Afghans with experiences from recent surgeries in these lands and possibly elsewhere and lasted more than two years. Throughout this time, the group apparently murdered several informants among the Moslem communities to the northern and southern parts of Maungdaw and others they were afraid might disclose their minds.
Two Saudi Arabia-based executives spend a whole months in the state of Rakhine in August 2016 to select goals and determine how and when the attack would take place. At the end of August there was an increasing number of known informants killed in the Rohingya population. Its purported goal was to take full command of Maungdawownship, disrupt communication with Buthidaung in theheast, and set up army stations on the ridge of the Mayu Mountains between Maungdaw and Buthidaung, thus establishing a defensible, free area in the same way as the major ethnically militarized groups in Myanmar's border areas in theheast.
Afterwards, the north of Buthidaung - a very aggressive scheme allowing full command over the Bangladesh frontier - and parts of Rathedaung should be attacked. It is unlikely to face financing bottlenecks now that it has demonstrated its legality and ability to engage in aggression.
At the beginning of September, after the two older guides had gone, two informants in U Shey Kya, near Nga Khu Ya, where one of the October 9 assaults took place, unveiled the identity of eight BGP members of the BGP who detained them on September 12. As a result, the agencies began making extensive remittances to informants in northern Maungdaw to compile records of people in their area who participated in illicit activities, some of whom escaped.
In addition, the locals say that an IED incidentally exploding in Ngar Sar Kyu on October 7th while being prepped attracted the interest of the police. Although in a hurry, the assaults showed some refinement, involving distraction; block age of fortifications with a compound charge (IEDs plus gunshot attack) on a convoi at some range; and falling off of trees over streets to stop warcraft.
They were able to organize themselves broadly, paying a large number of prospective informants in North Rakhine State before the raids to keep them calm and paying large slush money to the police to release inmates. It is unlikely to face financing bottlenecks now that it has demonstrated its legality and ability through attack.
She seems to receive funding from the Rohingya Diapora and large privately owned donor organizations in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East. This would not have been possible for Haj to become established and make in-depth arrangements without the takeover of some regional guides, especially church and community groups, in the north of Rakhine.
Yet this has never been a radicalized populace; the fact that some now accept force mirrors profound political failings over many years. While the fellowship follows a right-wing Islam, not a radical one in general, and even when individuals saw their laws, foundations and aspirations undermined, the great majority among church and civil society continues to shy away from violent acts, which they believe would lead to further discriminatory practices and subvert the goal of recognizing and protecting Myanmar's human dignity.
However, after the 2012 outbreak, part of the populace began to deal more actively with organized acts of terrorism. During a minoritarian opinion, it was carried by powerful individualists, among them some of the younger generations of church leaders in the north of Rakhine State, who began to change the minds of church superiors and older Cleric.
The 9 October bombings were the beginning of a change of opinion. However, there was significant critical of the WhatsApp group for not having consulted or warned the fellowship about the attack and for not taking into account the very serious outcomes. The issue of fatawas seems to have been just after the terrorist attack that was crucial in persuading many across Maungdaw to endorse the HaY initiative.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attack, some youngsters believe that the group has accomplished what their parents and grandparents could not. About twenty Rohingya from Saudi Arabia, among them Ata Ullah, worked with the students and guides on the spot for a long period of their lives and lived in contrast to the Rohingya gun group guides in the past.
A number of community chiefs who have watched the activity of the community leader say that they have been struck by their engagement, honesty and strength of purpose, and have received increased confidence and encouragement from the people. In the aftermath of the terrorist attack, some young people believe that the group has accomplished what their parents and grandparents could not.
One important part of HaY's triumph, the members of the locals say that these twenty or so guides had a good, safe life in Saudi Arabia, the dreams of many Rohingya, but were seen sacrificing comforts and wealth to stay next to poor village people, without having to wear good footwear or clothing and eat the same meager cuisine.
At the moment, after two laps of attack and a violent safety reaction, a considerable part of the Moslem people and the HaY minority seem to be supporting or sympathizing, even though the cruelty of the reaction of the army is causing some to escap. As well as the pre-October 9 assassinations, a Moslem man working as a BGP chef was kidnapped by other village residents in Laungdon and found in a rice fields on October 31 with his throats slit; on November 3, a former U Shey Kya local governor was found just as much as a 100-head of household in southern Maungdaw was found murdered on November 17.
The murders were committed in the same cruel way, presumably to create anxiety, while there were no assaults on the civilian Buddhists. Not surprisingly, such connections have existed, considering that over several dozen years threatened and marginalized Rohingya migrant and refugee workers were recruited by militants, mainly in Bangladesh at first, for use there and elsewhere.
HaY's open remarks and practices and interventions with its members all suggest, however, that it is an insurgency group directed against Myanmar's military personnel and seeks Rohingya's right - albeit probably counter-productive - in Myanmar, similar to the former Myanmar mujahidine groups (see Section II above).
MEPs of the Myanmar authorities have confirmed that their leader is well networked in Bangladesh, Pakistan and to a smaller degree in India; the Myanmar administration says that their interrogation shows that the education was conducted in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Rakhine State also taught Rakhine Recruiters to Rohingya and teachers from Pakistan and Afghanistan, both members of the group and the population.
Second, the Rohingya case has been propagandaised by multinational jihadi groups for several years. For example, threatening Myanmar by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (2012); calling by an Indonesian Muslim extreme leadership to lead jihadi in Myanmar (2013); IS leader's threat to take vengeance against Myanmar and several other nations for abuse of their Muslims; pledges to save Muslims in Myanmar and elsewhere from "injustice and oppression" in announcing the creation of "al-Qaida on the Indian subcontinent";
Quotes frequently in talks by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, leader of the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba fighters, on the "atrocities against the Rohingya Muslims" and appeals for vengeance; offerings of Taliban Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in June 2015 to "take the hand of the sword" of the Myanmar Muslims; as well as an appeal by the Bangladesh fighter Abu Ibrahim in the April 2016 edition of IS Dabiq to help the repressed Muslims in Myanmar in every way imaginable.
Apart from these expressions of sympathy and appeals for assistance, there is little proof that Myanmar is an operative high-profile group. Safety experts say that small armaments and explosive materials are available there, which should not be too hard to obtain if the group has links with local weapons dealers or Bangladeshis or local militants.
The goals and strategies of the company and its emphasis on safety goals indicate that it is Rohingya and not a transnational company. It' s important not to overinterpret the importance of the above-mentioned connections or to let the effort of some Myanmar civil servants, political figures and other political leadership to present Haz as part of the overall Jihad movements go undoubted.
The recent small explosion in Yangon is not directly related to the state of Rakhine. On 26 November, a number of alleged ly Muslim arrests were made by law enforcement officials, but no further information was made known. The direction of the migration authorities, which are also in charge of the nationality check, points to a possible connection with the Rakhine problem.
But if so, it was more an uninvited manifestation of sympathy or rage about the safety reaction than a straightforward assault that could have been thought to be more tragic. The formation of a new Islamic militarized group in the state of Rakhine poses a serious risk to the outlook for stabilization and develompen.
There is a major need for the authorities to direct their policies, policies and safeguards in such a way that they do not cause escalation of power and inter-municipal tension. They also require due consideration of the complaints and anxieties of Rakhine Buddhists. It is therefore important that any reactions are based on the recognition of why a hostile attitude has now taken place in the Rakhine state's Islamic people.
Over many years, this populace has undermined its human right and experienced its gradual exclusion from society and politics. It became particularly urgent at the height of the antimuslim violent events in Rakhine in 2012. As a result of this and with no prospect of recovery, some Rohingya in North Rakhine State and the Indian minority began to think about taking up weapons and making preliminary arrangements for a new uprising (see Section IV.C above).
The group' s determination to start an uprising should have been consolidated by three major events in 2015, creating a much more fruitful breeding grounds for it: deprivation of the rights of Moslem electorate, a failure to find a peaceful settlement and the closure of migratory flows to Malaysia (see Section III above).
It is the duty of the public agencies to react to the lethal attack on BGP base. Simultaneously, an overall approach that raises the feeling of despair among Muslims in the state of Rakhine must be accompanied by an efficient safeguard . It is not yet a radicalized people; parishioners, elderly people and church leadership have previously rejected force as counter-productive.
Although the growing desperation has led to more consideration being given to force, it is not too early for the administration to undo this when it recognizes that the people have been living in the region for generation and will keep doing so and decides to give them a place in the nation's live.
It is not yet a radicalized people; parishioners, elderly people and church leadership have previously rejected force as counter-productive. Everything indicates that HaY is prepared and capable of further assaults on terrorist groups. Ponderous safety precautions would directly conflict with the above goals, which would probably lead to more desperation and hostility among indigenous Muslims, increase HaY aid and provoke a deeper circle of force.
We also have a very realistic view of even greater relocations to Bangladesh. Experiences from other nations suggest that an offensive militaristic reaction that is not part of a wider political context would also be ineffectual against the militarised group and would run the danger of attracting greater interest from jihadi groupings. A well-organized, efficient, internationally networked uprising in the state of Rakhine could then offer a channel that previously did not existed for the terror.
That does not seem to be the HaY's goal, but the current state of affairs could allow global Jihadist groups to add their own agenda, for example by enlisting Rohingya (especially in Bangladesh) for such operations on Myanmar territory or attract alien combatants, especially from the sub-continent of India, who could fit in well.
There may also be a possibility that the limelight on the Rohingya distress is causing alien groups unrelated to Hazy to commit a terrorism plot; there was a thwarted attempted bombing of the Myanmar message in Jakarta, and the person who conducted the recent Ohio State University bombing in the US alleged to have been at least partially influenced by the repression of the Rohingya.
Reducing these dangers calls for policy rather than action: strengthening and enhancing the relationship between Islamic societies and the state of Myanmar, as well as better collaboration and exchange of information with local states. This kind of collaboration is vital to guarantee safety and to counter possible trans-national jihad threats immediately. Today's insecurity operations have weighed on our relationships with large numbers of Muslims with whom we have a real need for strong links.
The West is also concerned about the state of Rakhine and the government's lack of reaction. There has been a significant reduction in the scope for policies to address the fundamental questions of discriminatory treatment, nationality and the free flow of Muslims within the State of Rakhine. Burma reproached him for breaking Asean non-intervention policies and using the subject for internal affairs; Malaysia replied that Myanmar was persecuting "ethnic cleansing" and destabilizing Southeast Asia.
Whilst this was regarded in many circles as the primary internal policy goal for Najib, the wrath against Myanmar is genuine in large parts of the MoM. It would be of great use to Myanmar; it would also be in the interest of ASEAN, which has long been carrying the brunt of a large number of Rohingya returnees and immigrants, a stream that will grow if the force persists and leads to radicalization threats for the area.
Myanmar has convened a particular withdrawal of ASEAN in Yangon on 19 December to allow Aung San Suu Kyi to inform her of the peril. Burma should use this occasion to develop a trustworthy policy to combat it. A Suu Kyi's lead agency to tackle the crisis, the Consultative Committee headed by Kofi Annan in August, faces further great challenge following the October 9 bombings.
There has been a significant reduction in the scope for policies to address the fundamental questions of discriminatory treatment, nationality and the free flow of Muslims within the State of Rakhine. As of 1 December, the authorities announce another (national) committee to examine the assaults and reaction of the police and to examine actions to avoid new events. In the next few weeks and on 12 November, when a high-ranking military official was murdered, the violence against BGP base on 9 October 2016 and other confrontations mark the beginning of a new Islamic uprising in the north of Rakhine.
HaY Group is headed by a Rohingya emigrés board in Saudi Arabia and run by other Rohingya who have extensive expertise and expertise in contemporary guerilla strategy, the credentials of supporting community and multinational fatwa and significant support and support from the community of Muslims, which includes several hundred military-educated people.
This well-organized, well-funded group is a turning point in the Myanmar government's effort to tackle the state of Rakhine's long standing challenge of discriminating against its Islamic people, denying them access to justice and granting them nationality. In the absence of an overall policy that gives it hopes, the government's reaction to the attack - ill-considered use of armed forces that fail to differentiate fighters from civilians, refusal of humanitarian assistance to an ultra- vulnerably populated area - is unlikely to displace the group and create a cycle of conflict.
However, if the regime wrongly manages the conflict, also through the continuing use of excessive armed violence that has forced tens of millions of people across the Bangladesh borders, it could provide preconditions for the radicalisation of parts of the Rohingya people who could take advantage of jihadistic groups for their own purposes. A moderate militaristic reaction, a well-developed policy approach and enhanced co-operation and exchange of information with Myanmar's neighbors and the ASEAN block are needed to prevent this threat.