Timetables are your tickets to find out when your forebears landed in the USA and how they made the voyage - from the name of the vessel to the port of destination and the port of depart.
For the surname Grivi, 1,000 files are available. Army collectibles offer the veteran among your Grivi forefathers insight into where and when they ministered, and even physics as well.
graviI vs. surplus diet in and for loose angled county
California Supreme Justice. This is GRIVI v. SUPERIOR-COURT IN AND FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY et al. L. A. 15112. It is a request for the issuance of a term of office seeking to force the defendant to withdraw from its file - in particular from the file of the McAdoo v. McAdoo case, a paper entitled'Report of the Chairman Judge'.
It seems that on July 17, 1934, Ms. AcAdoo brought a petition for a divorce against her spouse in the Defendant's Tribunal. The same date, the documents in the case were taken before Judge Campbell of the Kern District, who was then seated in Los Angeles on behalf of the President of the Board of Justice, and the case was heard by Judge Campbell, who was given a restraining order by Ms McAdoo, without giving the date and place of the proceedings.
After the hearing of the aforementioned case of division, the examining magistrate conducted an inquiry into the events that led to the hearing of the case on the same date on which the complaint was made: in this case, the aforementioned documents are as follows: Chairman's report:
After she received a positive answer, she asked if there was a Judge Campbell and where he was and where his courtroom was. On the same date and before the hearing, someone called Judge Allan B. Campbell and asked him if he would try a case of divorce. No. The judge did not have a case. Judge Campbell was not acquainted with the practices of this tribunal, which require that all divorces be settled by the Schedule Division, and he is therefore in no way responsible for the unlawful treatment of this case.
Justice Campbell comes from Bakersfield, where there are only three magistrates, and each of them tries every standard case when presented to him. However, this tribunal has a completely different system for dealing with divorces. I have recalled several times, as the Chief Justice, documents from divisions where the same irregularities have been practised or tried to be practised.
I have no doubt that Mr Grivi, Mrs McAdoo's lawyer, was conscious of our normal procedures. In this case, his acts by contravening the known procedures and exploiting the ignorance of a guest magistrate are despicable, if not even unruly.
He has discredited this tribunal through his acts; he has made a countless group of men believe that there is a trial, slowly and boringly, for the needy; and another, quickly and actively, for the wealthy or celebrities; he has the moral and diligent members of the Chamber of Lawyers who do not condescend to such practice and put things in a very awkward situation with their client.
I am aware that the State Bar of California is looking into this issue and I will provide it with all the means at my disposal. In order to avoid a recurrence of such an irregularity, I have today ordered Mr L. E. Lampton, the district employee, not to allow any lawyer or litigator to take a case from the desk.
If they are needed in any division of the tribunal, he shall have them sent to such a division by one of his representatives or couriers. You can thank men like Mr. Grivi for this. I have also instructed Mr Lampton to direct each of his judicial staff to draw the attentions of their judge in any case where the normal recruitment process has not been respected.
Subsequently, and on August 1, 1934, the defendant's attorney filed a request to remove the file because it was not related to a matter in this case, and for several other grounds that need not be enumerated. Through their lawyer, the political groups determined that the request could be made, but the tribunal rejected it on 6 August 1934.
A record of the procedure relating to the written submission by the two sides to the tribunal to establish the facts of the request shows that the tribunal concerned deletes from the file the written submission that the accused has lodged an appeal against the decision to refuse to go on strike. 3.
Secondly, on the assumption of the accuracy of the first, it is claimed that the examining magistrate had the competence to prepare and submit the first. There can be no doubt that the enactment of the mandate does not serve to rectify the mistakes of an substandard judicial authority and that, insofar as it aims to prevent the strength or effect of a judicial decision, it represents a co-materal assault on it.
Therefore, we are accepting the facts on the files and confine our investigation to the issue of whether the magistrate was competent to submit the claim. However, we cannot support the opinion of those questioned that such a case law exists. It can be assumed that under the previously named judicial regulations the magistrate was entitled to examine a breach or an ostensible breach of the regulations of the courts by a lawyer at the Chamber of Lawyers (on the assumption that the facts named in the lawyer's reports are beyond reasonable doubt, that the lawyer has infringed these regulations), but certainly, as he admits in the letter of the ruling, the irregularities have no effect on the interim injunction.
Three possible uses (perhaps more) could have resulted from the information provided by the president's judges. These proposals all have to do with the lawyer's behaviour and not with the legal interests of those involved in the proceedings in the petition for divorce. Of course, the absence of the necessary measures to clothe the competent tribunal must be regarded as a disregard.
It is also disclosed, on the assumption that the tribunal has the authority to disciplin its officials in due and orderly cases, that no investigation has been initiated to obtain the case law on the lawyer. Inasmuch as the tribunal had conceded the right to initiate one of the above procedures as a separate suit against a legal adviser, it was not entitled to bring such a procedure as a secondary suit in connection with a petition for divorce.
There was indeed an ex partite inquiry by the court under its administrable tasks without notification of the lawyer and he was not competent to cause it to be disseminated on the petition files.