Burma in World MapMyanmar on the world map
Myanmar Maps of Myanmar New World Map
Myanmar Maps Of Myanmar New World Map is one of many pictures on this website, you can find the latest pictures of Burma Maps Of Myanmar New World Map on this website and other pictures, we sincerely wish that this can be useful for you. Myanmar Maps Of Myanmar New World Map is a good photo from our photo library, you can store it here in full HD quality which will make you feel at home and give you many detail about Burma Maps Of Myanmar New World Map, on this website we suggest pictures about Burma Maps Of Myanmar New World Map, which we have gathered from different pages of the world map, and of course, what we suggest is the most outstanding of Maps Asia and World Wide Collection for Burma Maps Of Myanmar New World Map.
So if you like the Maps Asia and World Wide Collection on our website, just come back and see us again. If you want to see more images, we suggest the following galery as a link from your Burma Maps Of Myanmar New World Map.
The Second World War was the biggest and most brutal pre-emptive armistice in the world. As the Second World war continued to attract the interest of militarists, historicists and its vets, a whole family of Americans has matured without realising the civilian, societal and militaristic consequences of a struggle that unified us more than all others as one nation with a single goal.
The Second World War has a lot to learn us today, not only about the armaments trade, but also about our readiness for the army, our overall strategies and our joint efforts in the campaign against Nazism. "The Second World War has been conducted on shore, at sea and in the sky over several different operating theatres for about six years.
It is my sincere wish that this gripping presentation of this time will increase your esteem for the US accomplishments during the Second World Peace Conference. The United States of America proclaimed Japan and actively participated in the Second World war on 8 December 1941, after the Pearl Harbor element. In 1937 Japan entered China and had slowly isolated it from the world except for two weak rail lines: a narrow-gauge railroad from Haiphong, French Indochina, and Burma Road, an upgraded dirt road connecting Lashio in British Burma with Kunming in China.
The material along these trails enabled Chiang Kai-shek's China nationalistic regime to withstand Japan's inland offensive. Japan used the 1940 outbreak of the Germans invading France to dismantle both utility pipelines to China. When France concentrated on the European conflict in June, Japan's ships left for Franco-Indochina and shut down the Haiphong railway.
Japan reached an understanding with the hard-pressed UK authorities to provisionally shut down the Burma Road for military supplies a month later, when the threat of conflict threatened if its requirements were not complied with. Burma Road was re-opened in October 1940, virtually the only line to China. At the end of 1941, the United States shipped rental equipment by ship to the Rangoon harbour in Burma, where it was reloaded onto railway wagons for the journey to Lashio in the north of Burma and eventually transported by lorry along the 712-mile Burma Road to Kunming.
As a result, strategicists in Japan agreed to sever Burma's life-line, take full command of China and release their armed services for deployment in other parts of the Pacific. Burma's geographical position had insulated it from India and China, its bigger and more densely populated neighbours. It was this scarcity of contacts that made Burma a different place from its two bigger neighbours, who in turn had little interest in Burma because of the inherent barrier to its invasion.
Japan's tragic candidacy for supremacy in the Far East in 1941, however, prompted both India and China and their foreign sponsors, Britain and the United States, respectively, to draw the country's heels. The British had earlier tried to rule Burma as a provincial government in India, but the synthetic mixture of the two civilizations turned out to be impracticable.
By 1937 Burma had become its own settlement with a largely independent state. Some of the leader of this group came to Tokyo in the years before 1941 and showed understanding for their struggle for freedom. Burma, however, was still a constant property in the view of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who apparently had no intent of chairing the disbandment of the British Empire.
Helium was Churchill's main target during the UK conflict, with both India and Burma still a colony, as they had been since 1941. It also wanted China to be considered an ally on an equal footing in the Japanese conflict, in the hopes that it would become a great nation that would be kind to the West.
Noting more directly and practically, holding China at war would also keep a large quota of the Japanese land troops occupying the continental Asia, away from US operations in the Pacific. Though the UK and the United States pursued the same strategy of eventually beating Japan, they did not agree on Burma's part in achieving this objective.
Burma was to be protected against the Japans, their rulers concurred, but their motivations were different. Burma represented a comfortable obstacle for the British between India, the "crown jewel" of their kingdom, and China with its Japan army occupations. Americans saw Burma as the artery that could allow China to shake off the chains of the Japans and become a vibrant member of the global population.
In spite of the Allies' resolve to keep Burma, their defence plan for the Burmese territory was not complete. Burmese were not counseled and had little cause to struggle the Japs. What is even more important is that neither Britain nor the United States were willing to use significant resources to rescue the area. Conversely, the Japonese leadership was willing to do more and considered Burma critically for its overall approach to the conflict.
Burma's occupations would safeguard the already secure profits in the South West Pacific, create the conditions for a possible Indian incursion, which could possibly be linked to expulsion by Germany from the Middle East, and once and for all shut down the Allied line of supplies along Burma Road to China.
Fewer than a weeks after the Pearl Harbor bombings, Jap airplanes took off from detention centres in Thailand and opened the Burmese incursion by bombarding Tavoy airfield, an advanced UK base on the Andaman Sea just South of Rangoon. On the next morning, December 12, 1941, small forces of Japan started the land attack by invading Burma.
Because they had not been preparing for the fighting, the UK Armed Services in Burma even had no basic needs such as an appropriate secret service. Despite the appointment of a civilian protection officer in November 1941, the Britons had taken no precautions, such as taking over the railways and navigable highways.
At the beginning of the battles, the only US battle troop that was even available at a distance was the young AVG (American Volunteer Group). AVG had started to train in Burma in the mid-1941s, out of reach of Japan's aerial attacks, until it was prepared for the war.
Both of the surviving wing sent to China to defend China's towns and patrolling the Burma Road. The United States realized that the British would need help when Japan began operating in Burma. AMMISCA, the US military mission in China, led by Brigadier General John Magruder, had been in Chungking since September 1941 to co-ordinate the US loan-to-China.
The War Department granted Magruder permission on 16 December to move loaned equipment waiting for transport from China to Britain in Rangoon docks. However, the transaction was conditional on the consent of the People' s Republic of China, as ownership of the material was technologically transfered to China after leaving the United States.
" Since the most precious material involved was a load of ammunition aboard the Tulsa, an US vessel anchoring in Rangoon port, the dispute became known as the Tulsa Incident. Rangoon's chief executive, General Yu Feipeng, a female relative of Generaleissimo, became the focus of the war.
Nevertheless, the Burmese government has asked for a panel of China, the United Kingdom and the United States to be set up to decide on the appropriate arrangement for certain types of machinery. The proposal was implemented immediately, and when Magruder's Chungking HQ found out about the committee's presence, it was already in the process of determining what to keep in Burma for UK purposes and what to ship to China.
Mr Sogruder was hoping to clarify the issue of the provision of China rental equipment to the British at a meeting in Chungking on 23 December, assuming that the Chinese had agreed to the measures already taken in Rangoon. However, like many Americans, he still had much to teach about domestic political and civilian matters.
Magruder was frightened on Christmas Day, when he heard the China accusation that the Brits had taken nationalistic equipment on loan in Rangoon with the help of the Americans, when the issue of segregated material aroused. Tulsa freight confiscation was an unkind act, the director had ruled that all the rental equipment should be handed over to the Britons or handed back to the Americans in Rangoon.
The entire Burmese staff in China would be returned to China and co-operation between China and Britain would be suspended. agruder immediately made conciliating gesture to the Brits and the Chinamen in the hopes of avoiding an imminent allied crack. Having heard Magruder's reassurances that everything was in order, the GM said that he had already authorised the first UK material request form.
It also penalized the US, UK and China allotment committees in Rangoon and proposed to work. agruder consented, and finally large quantities of arms and supplies initially destined for nationalist China went to the Brits to defend Burma. In fact, the conflict between the countries that defend Burma would make the whole operation more difficult.
Chiang Kai-shek's sudden changes of opinion, like his seeming inversion of the China tenancy agreement politics, were a permanent cause of confusion for US and UK officials who could never be sure when they had a genuine choice from him. Tulsa also highlighted the difference between UK and US politics towards China.
They fought for the fate of their kingdom in the Far East and had little interest in China. Americans who have been sensible with China in the past have tried to make it an equitable member of the Alliance. There were other issues with the British, who were envious of their own privileges.
They were willing, even fearful, to deploy units to help defend Burma. He proposed two armed groups with the condition that they would be operating in expelled areas under China's leadership and would not commit themselves to a fragmented fight. Initially hesitant to allow large amounts of China force to be operated in Burma, the British accepted to allow only one partition of China force.
Sir Archibald P. Wavell, Field Marshal, UK Commander-in-Chief in India, thought the Japan attack in Burma was exaggerated and doomed to doom. China's troops were not needed to win. The assumption of the use of a PRC department is an appropriate answer to the proposal of the Generals.
Though the British were cautious about China's involvement in Burma's defence, the Americans welcomed this notion. The Allied Arcadia Conference in Washington, D.C. received the China warning to end co-operation with Britain after the Tulsa outbreak. The Americans were concerned and feared that China might indeed pull out of the conflict.
These fears were further aggravated by Japan's continued success in the Pacific (Hong Kong gave in on Christmas and Manila was designated an open town the next day). Roosevelt, a long-standing China supporter, persuaded Churchill to calm the generalsimo by asking him to act as commander-in-chief of the Allied armed services in a dedicated Chinese theatre.
It was a somewhat concise proposal, as there had never been a scheme to send UK or US troops to China, and there would be no involvement of China in the Allied Chiefs of Defence. Nevertheless, the generalsimo took up the bid and even asked an US army commander to lead the allied team.
But he was a little less excited about the location, as he had already been provisionally chosen to lead the North African Allies' intrusion. From the beginning, his particular power of instruction was unclear. Before his nomination, the War Department had obtained China's agreement that Stilwell should order or at least have "executive control" over the Burmese armed services.
However, exercising power would turn out to be a rather vague concept that would cause a great deal of disorientation and resentment between Stylwell and the People. Stilwelle's instructions called him "Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander of the China Theatre". "When reporting to China's theatre, his order called him "Commanding General of the United States Forces in the China Theatre of Operations, Burma, and India".
" Instructions did not implicitly target the particular tasks contained in these locations, especially his relation to the UK theatre comands. However, with the perspective of taking command of the Burmese armed force, Stilwell was planning to organise his task force along the model of a corporate headquarter. Prior to his trip to the Far East, he had been granted permission by the War Department to appoint his military headquarter to admit all US troops that might join him to the United States Task Force in China.
Notwithstanding the fact that Stiwell gathered his co-workers in Washington and the long trip to the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater of Operations began, the Burmese context deteriorated dramatically. Following a round of gatherings in Washington, which were also attended by President Roosevelt, the Minister of Wars, and several different China embassies, Stiwell and his associates departed Florida on February 13, 1942, according to a Friday.
The CBI Theatre's success increased as the United States travelled to the Far East and made its 12-day journey through the Caribbean on a number of air trips to South America, Africa and the Middle East. On February 15, Singapore gave up with 80,000 soldiers; eight nights later the British-Indian fighting in Burma was defeated in the Battle of the Sittang Bridge, a failure that opened the way to Rangoon for the advancement of Japan.
In the face of ongoing Japan's pressures, the Australian-British-Dutch-American ABDACOM, which was deployed on 15 January to protect the area, was disbanded on 25 February. Though Stilwell was given responsibilities in China, Burma's early few month as Chiang Kai-shek's chiefs of foot overtook him. When Rangoon was under threat, Magruder ordered the annihilation of all stockpiles to be denied to the incurring Yangon.
When the Japanese were approaching, there was hectic action to transport as much material as possible northwards to Burma Road, but it was still necessary to demolish more than 900 lorries at various stage of assembling, 5,000 tyres, 1,000 covers and sheet and more than a metric tons of various objects.
Magnruder handed over a lot of material to the UK Armed Services, among them 300 UK fired cannons with 3 million shots of ammo, 1,000 machineguns with 180,000 shots of ammo, 260 SUVs, 683 lorries and 100 mobile phones. Despite the devastation and handover to the UK, over 19,000 tonnes of rental equipment was left in Rangoon when it was delivered to the Japanese on 8 March.
And the tenth was in India with a quest to help China. Maj-Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, an aviator with experience in the fight against the Japanes in the Netherlands, took control of the new Luftwaffe when it entered India in early March 1942. Though the tenth Luftwaffe was transferred to the CBI to assist the Chinese, the Japan attack in Burma means that the Brereton Bomber would serve the interests of two great allies, China and Britain.
It was a painful move for the two China troops to Burma. The British were able to offer some logistic assistance there, but not surprisingly they found it hard to handle them. This operation brought Magruder and AMMISCA in China and Brereton and the tenth Air Force in India under Stilwell's control.
Chiang Kai-shek and his new Allied Chieftain of-Staff met two day later, just before the Rangoon case. At her meeting on 6 March, Chiang Kai-shek voiced his concerns about the entire Burmese leadership and the state of Sino-British rapporteurs. "If the Brits tried to give orders to his commanding officers, they would just go home.
Commenting on his discontent with the UK leadership in Burma, the GM continued to surprise Stiwell by proposing that Stiwell should take full control of the whole operational area. In the aftermath of the summit, the China authorities sent a clear signal to Washington. Kai-shek's lively temper was known, and the foundation of general hostility between the Chineses and the Brits had been established hundreds of years before Stilwell's advent at the theatre.
For Burma, UK general leaders maintained supreme Allied control through the use of the country's empire's prerogatives, not an intergovernmental alliance. It was not mentioned in the December 1941 talks between China, Britain and the United States that the current chain of command in Burma was changed. However, the engagement of the large PRC armed services for the theatre would question and burden the current structures of control.
UK leadership responded strongly to the China suggestion. They were dissatisfied with Stilwell's command while they welcomed the two China armed groups to Burma. Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander, who commanded the UK armed force in Burma at the time, was expecting to inspect all of China's defensive allies.
That Stilwell had no permanent personnel also bothered the British, as they had already set up a connection system with the China armed services that would stretch to the division's outpost. The Roosevelt and Marshall replied in a similar way, proposing that the issue in Burma be solved by the participating states.
You reassured the Britons and the Chinese that Stylwell was an imaginative commando who could work well under any order. Whilst his leaders were struggling to solve these issues, Stylwell himself was still in Chungking and, to his consternation, learned that there would be some limitations on his Burmese commando.
Between March 6 and 11, Mr Stiwell held several talks with the Secretary General on Burma's defence and the forthcoming roles of the China Armed Services. Stylwell wanted to go on the attack and had already started to draw up reconquest of Rangoon. that a courageous approach could uncover Japan's weakness in Burma.
However, the dissenting tactician argued for prudence and insisted that the China armed force should stay on the defence. It made clear that the Fifth and Sixth Armies should not assault the Japanese if they were not provoke; it also laid down special geographic restrictions on the use of these troops. Lastly, he reaffirmed his suspicion of UK motivation and his persistence that the PRC remains separate from the UK team.
China, he said, has no interest in preserving the British Empire and would struggle long enough to keep the pipeline open in Burma. In early 1942, further success in Burma made an Allied attack in the area highly unlikely. After the overthrow of Rangoon in early March, the Allies were preparing to protect the two valleys that lead into the hearts of Burma along the Irrawaddy and Sittang Rivers.
Whilst the UK armed services were concentrating on proms along the Irrawaddy, the China division was concentrating on Toungoo along the Sittang, and both sides shared that keeping Toungoo was the keys to North Burma's defence. You decided to stay there as long as the Brits remained in Prome. However, Britain's secret service was fragile and unfamiliar to Burma's allied defense force, the Japanese continued to expand their armed force in the nation and had devised blueprints that would soon surpass these defences.
By the beginning of March, the Japanese already had four troops in Burma, twice as many as the Allies had expected. Japan was planning to encircle and destroy the Alliance troops in Mandalay, near the centre of Burma, by advancing three of their troops northward along separated driving alignments. There would be one section passing through Prome and Yenangyanug along the Irrawaddy Valley; another would go up the Rangoon-Mandalay Road in the Sittang Valley through Meiktila; and a third would go eastwards near Taunggyi and northwards to Lashio.
As the Allied troops were preparing their defence plan, the unfriendly Burmese aerial assistance was practically removed from the theatre. The RAF successfully raided an airport near Rangoon on 21 March, and destroyed several planes on the surface, losing only one RAF hurricane.
The Japanese had improved their theatre performance in March. In the aftermath of the UK strikes, the Japanese raided the Magwe airport, which was not adequately guarded, and many of the Allied planes were devastated on the surface. Other attacks followed and eventually forced the Allied aerial force out of Burma entirely.
With no resistance in the skies, the Japanes were able to enjoy almost limitless aerial recon, which, in conjunction with a rising number of friendly Burmese on the surface, provided them with in-depth information on the allied troops' deployments and motions. At the beginning of March, a Japan initiative was quickly successful. The 200th Division of China, however, continued for twelve consecutive visits to Toungoo against recurrent attacks from Japan.
Its position was the longest defence measure of allied armed services in the war. However, another great retreat by the Allies was unavoidable. Meanwhile, the Toungoo fight exposed the issues associated with Stilwell ordering the Burmese armed services. For example, when he ordered the 22nd Southern China División to release the 200nd, he was given few pretexts by the División Command.
In spite of Kai-shek's promises to the contrary, Stiwell had not received the "Kwan-fang" (seal or pork chop) as commander-in-chief in Burma; he had only been appointed head of personal. As a result, the Chinamen declined to obey Stilwell's orders until they were settled with the generalsimo, who insisted on his intransigence.
Prome's ensuing retreat of the division of 200 put the Burma Corps under pressure from a Japani war. Consequently, the Allies withdrew to the northern side at the end of March, with the Brits and the Chinese mutually guilty of the recurring setbacks. the XVI.
When he met Stilwell in Magwe on 24 March, the General of the German Luftwaffe guessed that his squad would not be operational until 1 May. Stylwell agreed to this estimation, and Brereton went back to his Delhi outpost. After a few get-togethers, a confused Stilwell heard of two bombings carried out by the tenth Luftwaffe against Japan on April 2: one in Port Blair on the Andaman Islands and a second in Rangoon.
Brereton, however, had got entangled between contradictory demands and authorised the April 2 mission to assist the British in India by order from Washington. When Brereton Stilwell had declared the issue, the case was resolved. The War Department cleared any further hopes of Burma's tenth World War II campaign on April 15.
Pursuant to UK wishes, the tenth would focus its effort on the defence of India. Meanwhile, although AVG was compelled out of Burma in March, Chennault tried to continue the struggle of Loiwing, directly in China. In April, the group flown patrolling and intelligence operations over the Burmese China routes, but their effort was too little to be significant.
In addition, AVG volunteers saw Burma operations as unnecessary and unrecognized risk. At the end of April, these efforts also came to a standstill as the ongoing pressures from Japan pushed AVG further into China. The first Allied attack on the country of Japan, James Doolittle's Raider bombarded the United States.
They had been taken off by Pacific carrier planes to fly to China and connect to APG after the attack on Japan. Stylwell has ordered an ambulance evac. Some of the Mandarin troops were able to retreat eastwards to China, but three of them went westwards to India.
Resolute to start a new defence campaign, Stilwell sent some of his personnel ahead to set up a base of trainings in India. May 6th Stilwell sent a final note, had his radio and cars demolished and walked westwards into the jungles. There were 114 persons with him, among them the remains of his own personnel, a group of nursing men, a Christian general with his own body guards, a number of UK commands, a gathering of engineers, a few civil men and a newsman.
Following a personnal example, Stilwell led the blended group to India and arrived there on May 15 without loosing a member of the group. A few short weeks later, on May 26, the expedition ended with hardly a wail when the last Allied troops fled Burma. We' ve escaped Burma and it's demeaning as hell.
" Burma's losses were a severe blow to the Allies. Without Allied help, China's capacity to resist the invading Japan was severely undermined. In military terms, the Allies' failures in Burma are due to the British being unprepared to face the British and the Chinese failing to help with all their hearts in defence.
However, by and large the conflicts of interest between the participating nations made the losses of Burma almost unavoidable. Respondent and intruders did not see Burma as anything other than a land to be overrun. For Britain, Burma was just a settlement and a useful bumper between China and India; for China, Burma was the life blood for domestic life; for the United States, Burma was the main way to keep China at gunpoint against Japan, which in turn would keep a large number of Japanese on the continent and US Pacific out.
From the beginning of the puppet show, the Japs had a huge benefit. Invasion troops were under a unique commando with one target, the conquest of Burma. Its determination and management unit were supplemented by the provision of appropriate ressources to fulfil the contract. Japan's aerial dominance brought considerable benefits to its troops, not least through aerial recon, in order to validate the Allied troops' disposition and deny their enemies the same information.
But if their rulers had considered such action necessary and consistent with their overall approach, the Japanes could have continued to take advantage of the assistance of Burma's people, who sought to evade so many centuries of UK domination. The Allies only carried out restricted surgeries in this "economy of force" theatre in order to attract the interest of the Japanese. 2. However, this part did not limit the armed allies' action to pure defence missions.
In the immediate aftermath of the Burmese humiliations, Stilwell's and the Allies' designers began preparing for their next campaigns, building on the lesson of the 1942 catastrophe. The Allies' policy during the next stage of the CBI theatre conflict would focus on reclaiming enough of Burma to restore a line of supplies to China.
Major General S. Woodburn Kirby, India's most perilous hour (1958), describes the UK angle of the Burma initiative in Vol. II of the War Against Japan seri. From 1911-45 (1971), Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, gives a deep insight into the most famous American of the campaignf.